Participants in some clinical trials are at risk of being harmed and sometimes are seriously harmed as a result of not being provided with available, relevant risk information. We argue that this situation is unacceptable and that there is a moral duty to disclose all adverse clinical trial results to participants in clinical trials. This duty is grounded in the human right not to be placed at risk of harm without informed consent. We consider objections to disclosure grounded in considerations of commercial interest, and we argue that these concerns are insufficient to override the moral duty to disclose adverse clinical trial results. However, we also develop a proposal that enables commercial interests to be protected, while promoting the duty to disclose adverse clinical trial results. [The American Journal of Bioethics 9(8) 2009: 24-32, with Mark Sheehan and Steve Clarke] [pdf | html]

The prospect of using memory modifying technologies raises interesting and important normative concerns. We first point out that those developing desirable memory modifying technologies should keep in mind certain technical and user-limitation issues. We next discuss certain normative issues that the use of these technologies can raise such as truthfulness, appropriate moral reaction, self-knowledge, agency, and moral obligations. Finally, we propose that as long as individuals using these technologies do not harm others and themselves in certain ways, and as long as there is no prima facie duty to retain particular memories, it is up to individuals to determine the permissibility of particular uses of these technologies. [Neuroethics 1(2) 2008: 85-99, with Anders Sandberg] [pdf | html]

In this paper, David Wasserman and I examine issues raised by the possibility of regulating emotions through pharmacological means. We argue that emotions induced through these means can be authentic phenomenologically, and that the manner of inducing them need not make them any less our own than emotions arising “naturally.” We recognize that in taking drugs to induce emotions, one may lose opportunities for self-knowledge; act narcissistically; or treat oneself as a mere means. But we propose that there are circumstances in which none of these concerns arise. Finally, we consider how the possibility of drug-regulation might affect duties to feel emotions. [Journal of Applied Philosophy 25(3) 2008: 178-192] [pdf | html]

[American Journal of Bioethics 7(9) 2007: 38–40, with David Wasserman]

Ashley was born with a condition called static encephalopathy, a severe brain impairment that leaves her unable to walk, talk, eat, sit up or roll over. In 2004, she was given the ‘Ashley Treatment,’ which included high-dose estrogen therapy to stunt her growth; the removal of her uterus via hysterectomy to prevent menstrual discomfort; and the removal of her breast buds to limit the growth of her breasts. Ashley’s parents argue that the Ashley Treatment was intended “to improve our daughter’s quality of life and not to convenience her caregivers.” In this paper, we argue for four conclusions. First, body modification of the Ashley Treatment type may, in the case of Ashley, be in her best interests. Secondly, it is not necessarily wrong though to act out of the motive to convenience caregivers, that is, the interests of parents or other caregivers. Thirdly, even if stunting Ashley’s growth may be ethically justifiable, the removal of her uterus and her breast buds are more questionable. Finally, Ashley’s case calls to attention the fact that every able person in our society may have a duty to provide support and assistance to those who are giving care, not just to the likes of Ashley, but also to normal children, the elderly and others in care. [The Hastings Center Report 37 (2) 2007: 16-20, with Julian Savulescu and Mark Sheehan] [pdf | html]

Despite the therapeutic potential of human embryonic stem (HES) cells, many people believe that HES cell research should be banned. The reason is that the present method of extracting HES cells involves the destruction of the embryo, which for many is the beginning of a person. This paper examines a number of compromise solutions such as parthenogenesis, the use of defective embryos, genetically creating a “pseudo embryo” that can never form a placenta, and determining embryo death, and argues that none of these proposals are likely to satisfy embryoists, that is, those who regard the embryo as a person. This paper then proposes a method of extracting HES cells, what might be called the Blastocyst Transfer Method, that meets the ethical requirements of embryoists, and it considers some possible concerns regarding this method. It concludes by encouraging future HES cell research to investigate this method. [The American Journal of Bioethics, 5 (6) 2005: 8-16] [pdf | html]

[The American Journal of Bioethics, 5 (6) 2005: W10-13]

It is quite probable that one will soon be able to use genetic engineering to select the gender of one’s child by directly manipulating the sex of an embryo. Some might think that this method would be a more ethical method of sex selection than present technologies such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), since, unlike PGD, it does not need to create and destroy “wrong-gendered” embryos. This paper argues that those who object to present technologies on the ground that the embryo is a person are unlikely to be persuaded by this proposal, though for different reasons. [Journal of Medical Ethics 31 (2005): 116-118] [pdf | html]

Experiments have suggested that umbilical cord blood stem cells can be used to prevent diseases such as atherosclerosis. This paper discusses ethical issues surrounding such usage such as the uncertainty that individuals at risk of a disease will actually get the disease; issues related to research with children; safety issues; from where these stem cells would be obtained; and whether these usages should be considered as therapies or as physical enhancements. [Journal of Medical Ethics 33 2007:643-646, with Pascal Goldschmidt and Jeremy Sugarman]

In recent years, many nonconsequentialists such as Frances Kamm and Thomas Scanlon have been puzzling over what has come to be known as the Number Problem, which is how to show that the greater number in a rescue situation should be saved without aggregating the claims of the many, a typical kind of consequentialist move that seems to violate the separateness of persons. In this paper, I argue that these nonconsequentialists may be making the task more difficult than necessary, because allowing aggregation does not prevent one from being a nonconsequentialist. I shall explain how a nonconsequentialist can still respect the separateness of persons while allowing for aggregation. [Utilitas 20(4) 2008: 447-461] [pdf | html]