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	<title>S. Matthew Liao &#187; Epistemology</title>
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		<title>A Defense of Intuitions</title>
		<link>http://www.smatthewliao.com/2008/05/02/a-defense-of-intuitions/</link>
		<comments>http://www.smatthewliao.com/2008/05/02/a-defense-of-intuitions/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 02 May 2008 03:38:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>S. Matthew Liao</dc:creator>
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		<description><![CDATA[Radical experimentalists argue that we should give up using intuitions as evidence in philosophy. In this paper, I first argue that the studies presented by the radical experimentalists in fact suggest that some intuitions are reliable. I next consider and reject a different way of handling the radical experimentalists’ challenge, what I call the Argument [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Radical experimentalists argue that we should give up using intuitions as evidence in philosophy. In this paper, I first argue that the studies presented by the radical experimentalists in fact suggest that some intuitions are reliable. I next consider and reject a different way of handling the radical experimentalists’ challenge, what I call the Argument from Robust Intuitions. I then propose a way of understanding why some intuitions can be unreliable and how intuitions can conflict, and I argue that on this understanding, both moderate experimentalism and the standard philosophical practice of using intuitions as evidence can help resolve these conflicts. [<a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/3507675837420008/">Philosophical Studies 140(2) 2008: 247-262</a>] [<a href="http://www.smatthewliao.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/liaointuitions.pdf">pdf</a> | <a href="http://www.smatthewliao.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/liaointuitions.htm">html</a>]</p>
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