The
Genetic Account of Moral Status: A Defense
(Forthcoming in the
Journal of Moral Philosophy)
S. Matthew Liao
New
York University
285
Mercer Street
New
York, NY 10003
matthew.liao@nyu.edu
Abstract
Christopher
Grau argues that the genetic basis for moral agency account of rightholding is
problematic because it fails to grant all
human beings the moral status of rightholding; it grants the status of
rightholding to entities that do not intuitively deserve such status; and it
assumes that the genetic basis for moral agency has intrinsic/final value, but
the genetic basis for moral agency only has instrumental value. Grau also argues that those who are inclined
to hold that all human beings are rightholders should reconsider speciesism. In this paper, I argue that Grau’s objections
do not undermine the genetic basis for moral agency account of rightholding,
and I also offer criticisms of Grau’s defense of speciesism.
Keywords
moral
status; moral standing; personhood; moral agency; speciesism; intrinsic value;
instrumental value; rightholding
In
“The Basis of Human Moral Status,” I argued that virtually all human beings are
rightholders because virtually all human beings have the genetic basis for
moral agency, and having the genetic basis for moral agency is sufficient for
one to be a rightholder.[1] As I explained, an advantage of this account
of rightholding is that it allows virtually all human beings to be rightholders
without being speciesist, because the
genetic basis for moral agency is an identifiable, physical attribute that
non-human entities can also possess. In
fact, I argued that if some super artificial intelligent beings were made up of
non-genetic, that is, non-carbon-based, isomorphic material, but they still
possessed something functionally similar to the genetic basis for moral agency,
they would also be rightholders, given that they have the physical basis for the development of moral agency, or, the
physical basis for moral agency, for short, even if they did not have the
genetic basis for moral agency. In other
words, in my view, if an entity has the physical basis for moral agency, then
the entity is a rightholder, whether the physical basis is genetic or something
else. Nevertheless, since most living things that we know are genetic-based
life forms, to keep things simple, I called this the genetic basis for moral agency
account of rightholding – henceforth, the genetic account.
In
“Moral Status, Speciesism, and Liao’s Genetic Account,”[2]
Christopher Grau offers three objections to the genetic account:
1) It
fails to grant all human beings the
moral status of rightholding.
2) It
grants the status of rightholding to entities that do not intuitively deserve
such status.
3) It
assumes that the genetic basis for moral agency has intrinsic/final value, but
the genetic basis for moral agency only has instrumental value.
After presenting these objections, Grau then
proposes that those who are sympathetic to the idea that all human beings are
rightholders should reconsider the speciesist option. In this paper, I shall explain why Grau’s
objections do not undermine the genetic account. I shall also question Grau’s speciesist option.
1.
Virtually all human beings vs. All Human Beings
In my article, I said that:
It might be necessary to concede that there is a
theoretical possibility that a human being could lack the genetic basis for
moral agency, even if all present cases of deletions are not cases in which
human beings lack this basis. In
particular, owing to advances in genetic engineering, someone might be able to
create such an individual artificially.[3]
I did not fully concede this point because, as I
explained in the paper, “it could be questioned whether such an individual
would be a human being at all. This
raises the difficult issue of what makes a being human, and whether the genetic
basis for moral agency is an essential human property.”[4] To elaborate, presumably, the genes for moral
agency are not just some minor genes such as the genes for toe nails. Indeed, the genes for moral agency may be
necessary for the development of a brain generally, and/or for the various
capacities necessary for moral agency such as rationality and empathy. Given this, suppose someone tried to create a
human being without the genetic basis for moral agency. The resulting entity, if it could survive at
all, may turn out to be one without a brain and/or one without the capacities
for rationality and empathy. In such a
case, would the resulting entity still be a human being? It is not obvious that it would be. And if such an entity were not a human being,
then it would not be necessary for me to concede that there could be human
beings who lack the genetic basis for moral agency. Moreover, even though I was skeptical that
there could be human beings who lack the genetic basis for moral agency, I
argued that even if we accepted this possibility, we can still conclude that for practical purposes, virtually all
living human beings we are likely to encounter will have the genetic basis for
moral agency.
In his discussion, Grau doesn’t
consider whether an entity could lack the genetic basis for moral agency and
still be a human being. He simply
assumes that this could be the case and he makes four points against the
genetic account:
a) “[Liao’s]
approach does not justify attributing the status of rightholder to [human
beings who lack the genetic basis for moral agency]” (389).
b) Liao
“admits it is possible that there really are such human beings: for example, it
is an open question whether some cases of anencephaly have the sort of genetic
cause that also affects the genes necessary for moral agency” (389).
c) “[Liao]
does not deny that there could be cases of severe retardation caused by damage
to the genetic basis for moral agency” (389).
d) Liao’s
approach gives the wrong answer regarding the Betsy case (390-391). (I shall explain what this case is below.)
Let me discuss each point in turn.
a) is ambiguous. Grau could mean that on the genetic account, human
beings who lack the genetic basis for moral agency would not be rightholders,
or he could mean that the genetic account is silent on whether these
individuals are rightholders. The former
would be false, because, as Grau is aware, the genetic account offers only a
sufficient condition for rightholding; it does not offer a necessary condition
for rightholding. Indeed, I explicitly
said that “suppose it were possible to genetically engineer a being to lack
just one gene for the genetic basis for moral agency and still to be human,
although this human being would not have the genetic basis for moral agency,
this human being could still be a rightholder on other grounds.”[5] So it is not true that these individuals
could not be rightholders, supposing that the genetic account were true. If by a), Grau means instead the latter,
namely, that the genetic account is silent on whether these individuals are
rightholders, this just restates what I have said is an implication of my view
and therefore does not constitute an objection, or at least a new
objection.
b) rests on a
misunderstanding. What I said in
footnote 19 of my article, which Grau cites, is that “it is an open question
whether anencephaly even has a
genetic cause” (my italics).[6] In other words, I was questioning whether
anencephaly has a genetic cause at all.
To elaborate, what we know about anencephaly is that it is mostly caused
by environmental factors such as folic acid deficiency; undiagnosed diabetes;
hypervitaminosis A; high temperatures of 102 degrees or higher for more than 5
hours; anticonvulsant medication, especially valporic acid (valporate); or
environmental/chemical exposure.[7] Scientists know that some genetic disorders
such as Waardenburg syndrome seem to have a higher incidence of anencephaly
(they seem to share the pax3 gene mutation, which controls some aspects of the
development of the face and inner ear).
But this is far from claiming that anencephaly has a genetic cause. If it is not even clear that anencephaly has
a genetic cause, obviously it would be even less clear that anencephaly is the
result of a defect of the genes that make up moral agency. So, contrary to what Grau has said, I did not
admit that it is possible that there really are such human beings or that
anencephaly is an instance of them.
Likewise, c) is a misinterpretation
of my view. I questioned specifically
whether there are actual cases of severe retardation caused by damage to the
genetic basis for moral agency. I did so
by distinguishing between genetic defects of the genes that make up moral
agency and genetic defects that undermine the development of moral agency, and
arguing that actual cases of severe retardation are of the latter kind rather
than of the former kind.[8] Here Grau also says that
[Liao] points out that many genetic defects are
caused by the mutation of a single gene, and there is the implication that
since only one gene is involved, the chances of the genetic material
responsible for moral agency being damaged are slim (389).
This is also a misinterpretation. My argument isn’t that because only one gene
is involved, the chances of the genetic material responsible for moral agency’s
being damaged are slim. Instead, my
argument is that in these cases, the brain tissues had developed normally and
would have continued to do so except for the abnormal build-up of certain amino
acids. Indeed, many of these cases can
be treated if one offers the treatment early enough. Given this, I argued that the defect is one
that undermines the development of moral agency rather than a defect in the
genes that make up moral agency.
In response to this distinction,
Grau says that:
I worry that Liao moves too quickly in generalizing
here. It may be that some single-gene
genetic defects are such that a human possessing them can develop normally if
given early treatment, but it just doesn’t follow that we should thus presume
(as he does) that all single-gene defects ought to thus be classified as cases
in which the development of moral agency is “undermined” rather than prevented
due to damage to the relevant genes (390).
But I did not presume that all single-gene defects
are cases in which the development of moral agency is “undermined” rather than
prevented owing to damage to the relevant genes. This is an empirical matter and requires
further empirical investigation. What I
did (and still do) think is that given my distinction, and given that many
single-gene defects are cases in which human beings can develop normally if
given early treatment, the onus is on others to show that a particular genetic
defect is a defect in the genetic basis for moral agency rather than a defect
that undermines its development.
d) Grau argues that my approach
gives the wrong answer to the Betsy case.
Let me quote Grau’s description of this case in full:
[D]ue to your being exposed to a new and dangerous
type of radiation, your child (let’s call her Betsy) suffers from a genetic
disorder that has left her alive and conscious but with a level of intelligence
that falls well below what is necessary for ever exercising moral agency. This
disorder is new, very rare and not well understood, but the doctors, having
performed many tests, assure you that, though your child’s genetic damage does permanently undermine her capacity for
moral agency, the damaged genetic material is not among the material that makes
up “the genetic basis for moral agency.” As a Liaoian, you breathe a sigh of
relief, confident that your child is in fact deserving of the moral status we
extend to most humans. However, imagine that several months later the doctor
calls back: there’s been a terrible mix up, and your child’s test results were
swapped with those of another severely disabled child. It turns out that your
child does as a matter of fact suffer from genetic damage to the relevant
portion of the genome responsible for moral agency, for she is missing a single
highly relevant gene. (“Sorry honey, the new results are in, and it turns out
Betsy may not be a rightholder after all!”) (390-391).
Grau argues that “Surely there is a problem with any
account of moral status that could (even just theoretically) put you in this
position” (391).
Five
remarks are in order. First, I fail to
see how the case of Betsy is substantively any different from the case I
discussed in my article in which someone genetically engineers a human being to
lack the genetic basis for moral agency.
Secondly,
Grau simply assumes that there could be human beings who lack the genetic basis
for moral agency. But, as I argued
earlier, this is a questionable assumption.
Grau casually mentions that Betsy is missing a ‘single highly relevant
gene.’ However, this missing gene is
not just a gene for toe nails. It is a
gene for moral agency, which means that it may be needed for the development of
a brain generally, and/or for the various capacities necessary for moral agency
such as rationality and empathy.
Importantly, this missing gene may also be sufficient to make it the
case that Betsy is not a human being, despite her resembling one. If Betsy turns out not to be a human being,
then the case of Betsy would not be one in which a human being lacks the
genetic basis for moral agency, but rather, one in which an entity resembles a
human being and lacks the genetic basis for moral agency.
Thirdly,
whether Betsy is a human being who lacks the genetic basis for moral agency, or
an entity that resembles a human being and that lacks the genetic basis for
moral agency, as I have said, the genetic account offers only a sufficient
condition for rightholding; it does not offer a necessary condition for
rightholding. So, even on the genetic
account, Betsy could still be a rightholder on other grounds.
In a footnote, Grau criticizes my
responding that the genetic account offers only a sufficient condition for
rightholding. He writes:
Liao would presumably protest at this point that
he’s only offering a sufficient condition, and perhaps some other condition
could be introduced that would cover Betsy as a rightholder on different
grounds. Perhaps, but until Liao offers a plausible account of such a condition
(and that would need to be an account which does not, in the process, make his
“genetic” condition for rightholder status appear redundant and thus
toothless), the story of Betsy provides a significant challenge to the
plausibility of Liao’s approach (391, footnote 4).
Grau does not explain why if I do not ‘offer a
plausible account’ to explain Betsy’s moral status, the plausibility of the
genetic account would be challenged. In
any case, without repeating the arguments above of why the case of Betsy does
not undermine the genetic account, here it is useful to point out that at the
end of his article, Grau says that “a sensible speciesist will follow Liao’s
lead and grant that species membership should best be understood as simply a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for the relevant
sort of moral status.” This raises the
question of why it is a problem for me to respond that the genetic account
offers only a sufficient condition for rightholding, but it is not a problem
for Grau to respond that his speciesist approach offers only a sufficient
condition for rightholding.
Fourth, Grau argues that ‘there is a
problem with any account of moral status that could (even just theoretically)
put you in’ Betsy’s parent’s position, but what Grau fails to realize is that
he faces a similar problem. Consider the
case of Carin:
Owing to your being exposed to a new and dangerous
type of radiation, your child (let’s call her Carin) suffers from a genetic
disorder that has left her alive and conscious but with a level of intelligence
that falls well below what is necessary for ever exercising moral agency. This
disorder is new, very rare and not well understood, but the doctors, having
performed many tests, assure you that, though your child’s genetic damage does permanently undermine her capacity for
moral agency, the damaged genetic material is not among the material that
disqualifies her from being a member of
the human species. As a Grauian, you breathe a sigh of relief, confident
that your child is in fact deserving of the moral status we extend to most
humans. However, imagine that several months later the doctor calls back:
there’s been a terrible mix up, and your child’s test results were swapped with
those of another severely disabled child. It turns out that your child does as
a matter of fact suffer from genetic damage to the relevant portion of the
genome responsible for her being a member
of the human species, for she is missing a single highly relevant gene.
(“Sorry honey, the new results are in, and it turns out Carin may not be a
rightholder after all!”)
In the case of Carin, one can also follow Grau in
arguing that ‘surely there is a problem with any account of moral status that
could (even just theoretically) put you in this position.’ In a footnote, Grau mentions that he holds a
folk notion of species rather than a scientific notion of species (396). So he might try to argue that on a folk
notion, Carin would still be a member of the human species. But Grau needs to say what he means by such a
folk notion and how Carin would in fact be a member of the human species on
such a notion. Grau may respond instead
that his speciesist approach offers only a sufficient condition for
rightholding, but not a necessary one.
In other words, Grau may say that Carin could still be a rightholder on other
grounds. But this returns us to
something I had mentioned earlier, namely, why is it a problem for me to
respond that the genetic account offers only a sufficient condition for
rightholding, but it is not a problem for Grau to respond that his speciesist
approach offers only a sufficient condition for rightholding?
Finally, lest one think that other
accounts of rightholding can avoid the case of Betsy, this is not so. For instance, one can easily construct a
similar case in which a child appears to have sentience, but the doctor then
realizes that the child does not have sentience. The lesson to draw from all this, I think, is
that Grau’s case of Betsy proves too much.
2.
Aliens and Super Artificial Intelligent Beings vs. Cabbages and Lawnmowers
As I explained earlier, one of the virtues of the
genetic account is that it allows non-human entities such as aliens, possibly
Great Apes, super artificial intelligent beings, and so on, to be rightholders,
if these entities have the physical (usually genetic) basis for moral
agency. Indeed, should we one day be
able to upload ourselves to some supercomputer, on the genetic account, our
moral status could be preserved, if our new, inorganic selves also possess
something functionally similar to the genetic basis for moral agency.[9]
Allowing
non-human entities to be rightholders naturally raises the issue of where one
draws the line. In my article, I considered
someone’s injecting the genes for moral agency into a cabbage, and I asked
whether the resulting entity would be a rightholder. I argued that it is important to determine whether
these genes are integrated into the cabbage or not. If they are integrated into
the cabbage, I argued that the cabbage would no longer be a cabbage, because
its nature would have changed. In such a
case, the resulting being may be a rightholder if it has the genetic basis for
moral agency. A real life parallel may
be transplanting human genes into a rabbit egg and creating an embryo with
human characteristics.[10] Arguably, such an entity may be a
rightholder, if it has the genetic basis for moral agency.
Grau
tries to put pressure on this aspect of the genetic account by presenting two
cases. The first is a variant of the
cabbage case in which the genetic basis for moral agency is injected and
integrated into a cabbage, but the resulting entity is damaged such that the
capacity for moral agency, along with the capacity for sentience and rational
agency, is permanently undermined. Grau
argues that:
(Like an anencephalic infant that possesses the
genetic basis for moral agency, this cabbage would appear to be a rightholder
on Liao’s account, even though it lacks both actual moral agency and the
potential for moral agency.) While I’m sure intuitions will vary here, I’m also
certain that many people will find this exotic, damaged, insentient,
rightholding cabbage a rather unhappy consequence of Liao’s theory (392).
The second case involves an artificial lawnmower
that has the relevant hardware and software needed to count as “functionally
similar” to the genetic basis for moral agency.
Grau adds that:
This machine has that hardware and software present
and "integrated" but permanently undermined due to damage (like the
anencephalic infant). This lawnmower would be a rightholder even though it will
forever lack sentience, moral agency, and even the potential for moral agency
(393).
According to Grau, in both cases, the genetic
account faces unpalatable implications such as the idea that the resulting entities
could be morally weightier than, e.g., a turtle (392-393).
For one thing, the way Grau
describes these cases is misleading. As
I have said, a cabbage that has the genetic basis for moral agency integrated
into it would no longer be a cabbage, as its nature would have changed. In such a case, it would be misleading to
continue to call the resulting entity a cabbage. Compare: after transplanting human genes into
a rabbit egg and creating an embryo with human characteristics, it would be
misleading to continue to call the resulting entity a rabbit egg.
Also,
Grau has introduced an additional confounding factor into these two cases,
namely, these entities are damaged in a way similar to anencephalic
infants. This muddles the issue because
what Grau wants to show is that the genetic account allows strange, non-human
entities to be rightholders. But Grau’s
cases are partly playing on the intuition, which some have that anencephalic
infants are not rightholders. If people
believe that the entities in Grau’s cases are not rightholders because they
believe that anencephalic infants are not rightholders and these entities are
like anencephalic infants, then the issue with the genetic account for these
people would be that it allows anencephalic infants and anencephalic
infant-like entities to be rightholders.
The issue would not be that the genetic account allows strange,
non-human entities to be rightholders.
In
fact, as a speciesist, Grau himself believes that anencephalic infants are rightholders. Given this, it seems disingenuous for him to
use cases that play on the intuition that anencephalic infants are not
rightholders.
Finally,
once Grau’s cases are described in a less misleading way, i.e., the resulting
entities are no longer called cabbage and lawnmower, respectively; and once the
confounding factor is removed, i.e., these entities are not like anencephalic
infants, these cases would substantively be no different than the case that I
have already discussed (in fact, one of them would be exactly the same as my
case). More importantly, it would not
seem counterintuitive, at least to me, to hold that these entities could be
rightholders and that such entities could be morally weightier than, e.g., a
turtle. Compare: it does not seem counterintuitive
to me to hold that an alien that has the genetic basis for moral agency or a
super artificial intelligent being that has the physical basis for moral agency
could be morally weightier than, e.g., a turtle.
3.
The Genetic Basis for Moral Agency: Instrumental or Intrinsic Value, or Both?
In my article, I refrained from offering an
independent argument for the genetic account.
As I explained, there may be no non-circular way of defending any account of rightholding.[11] Nevertheless, Grau tries to speculate on how
I might provide such an independent argument.
According to Grau, “presumably
[Liao] thinks that the genetic material relevant for moral agency possesses
some sort of intrinsic or final value,” that is, “a sort of value that is not instrumental” (394). Grau argues
that if I do not regard the genetic basis for moral agency as having
intrinsic/final value, it would be “quite hard to explain why we should grant
it the moral importance that [Liao] thinks it deserves” (394).[12]
Grau then argues that the genetic
basis for moral agency must only have instrumental value. According to Grau, to the extent that it is
plausible that an appropriately programmed machine could possess the physical
basis of moral agency and be a rightholder,
it
is because we naturally think of such a machine as at least potentially capable
of exercising moral agency: what is
valuable about that relevant series of 1s and 0s (embodied in hardware) is that
they normally produce moral agency. In other words, that physically-realized
stretch of programming code is instrumentally valuable because it normally
allows for the entity to possess something that seems valuable in itself:
actual moral agency (394-395).
Grau
argues that “It seems highly implausible to think that, on top of its obvious
instrumental value, that series of code also
possesses some sort of non-instrumental moral value” (395).
I remain skeptical about whether
there can be a non-circular way of defending any account of rightholding.
So I shall refrain from speculating here on whether the genetic basis
for moral agency has intrinsic/final value or instrumental value, or both. What I shall do is explain why Grau’s
arguments are suspect.
First, while I am not averse to the
idea that the genetic basis for moral agency has some sort of intrinsic/final
value, Grau’s reasoning as to why I must think this is not sound. Recall that Grau argues that if I do not
think that the genetic basis for moral agency has some sort of intrinsic/final
value, it would be ‘quite hard to explain why we should grant it the moral
importance that [Liao] thinks it deserves.’
Grau therefore thinks that in order for something to have great moral
importance it is plausible to assume that it has intrinsic or final value. But this is false. Many things that are highly morally important
have only instrumental value. For
instance, water is highly morally important to human beings. Without water, human beings would die. Yet, water only has instrumental value. Same things can be said about air, food, and
so on. If this is right, then it is not
true that in order for something to have great moral importance it must have
intrinsic/final value. It also means
that even if it turns out the genetic basis for moral agency has only
instrumental value, it would not follow that it could therefore not have great
moral importance.
Secondly, Grau’s argument that the
genetic basis for moral agency must only have instrumental value is also
questionable. In his example of an
appropriately programmed machine that possesses the physical basis of moral
agency, Grau argues that the physical basis for moral agency is instrumentally
valuable ‘because it normally allows for the entity to possess something that
seems valuable in itself: actual moral agency,’ and that ‘it seems highly
implausible to think that, on top of its obvious instrumental value, that
series of code also possesses some
sort of non-instrumental moral value.’
For one thing, Grau seems to think that actual moral agency only has
intrinsic/final value. However, not
every actual moral agent acts morally.
Given this, the value of actual moral agency may in fact be primarily
instrumental, namely, it enables some actual moral agents to act morally. More importantly, Grau seems to overlook the
fact that something can have both instrumental and intrinsic/final value at the same time. For instance, playing tennis can be an
instrumental good (it is good for health) and an intrinsic/final good (it is
good for its own sake) at the same time.
Given this, even if Grau has shown that the genetic basis for moral
agency has instrumental value, he has not shown that it only has instrumental value.
4.
Should We Opt for Speciesism?
Grau’s defense of speciesism is brief. So I shall also be brief. According to Grau, speciesism has the
following advantages over the genetic account:
i)
There are no worries about preventing
some humans being such as Betsy from being rightholders (396).
ii) There
are no worries about allowing some “exotic cabbages” to be rightholders (396).
iii) Speciesism
tracks “something many take to have non-instrumental moral value: membership in
the class of human beings” (396).
i) and ii) reiterate the points he has made against
the genetic account. So I shall not
repeat my arguments of why i) and ii) are not problematic for the genetic
account. Regarding iii), as far as I can see, Grau simply asserts that
membership in the class of human beings has non-instrumental, i.e.,
intrinsic/final, value. But why should
we believe this? Membership in the class
of human beings is not like the parent–child relation, which is typically a
relation constituted by love and deep personal relationship. Nor is it like cultural membership, which is
typically a relation based on shared values.
Indeed, as many have argued, and as Grau is aware, membership in the
class of human beings is more like membership in a racial group in being a
purely biological relation, i.e., a matter of genealogy, genetics, or capacity
for interbreeding, depending on one’s understanding of the concept of a
species.[13] Given this, it seems that Grau needs to say
much more about how membership in the class of human beings has intrinsic/final
value, if he wants to argue that it has such value.
Hence, Grau’s objections do not
undermine the genetic account and he needs to say much more to motivate the
speciesism option. If so, the genetic
account remains a real and coherent alternative to present accounts of
rightholding.[14]
[1] S.
Matthew Liao, "The Basis of Human Moral Status," Journal of Moral
Philosophy 7 (2010): 159-179.
[2] Christopher
Grau, "Moral Status, Speciesism, and Liao's Genetic Account," Journal
of Moral Philosophy 7 (2010): 387-396.
Subsequent references to Grau’s article are given in the text.
[3] Liao, "The Basis of Human Moral Status," p. 167.
[4] Liao, "The Basis of Human Moral Status," pp. 167-168.
[5] Liao, "The Basis of Human Moral Status," p. 168.
[6] Liao, "The Basis of Human Moral Status," p. 166.
[7] CDC,
"Effectiveness in Disease and Injury Prevention: Use of Folic Acid for
Prevention of Spina Bifida and Other Neural Tube Defects, 1983--1991,"
MMWR 40 (1991).
[8] Liao, "The Basis of Human Moral Status," pp. 166-167.
[9] S.
Matthew Liao, "Twinning, Inorganic Replacement, and the Organism
View," Ratio 23 (2010): 59-72.
[10] Ying Chen, Zhi Xu He, Ailian Liu, and Kai Wang, "Embryonic Stem Cells Generated by
Nuclear Transfer of Human Somatic Nuclei into Rabbit Oocytes," Cell
Research 13 (2003): 251-263.
[11] Liao, "The Basis of Human Moral Status," p. 169.
[12] Grau also says
that “Liao has argued forcefully that the genetic material should not simply be valued instrumentally – it
is not to be seen as valuable only because it can allow for either actual moral
agency or the potential for moral agency.
This seems to leave him with the view that the material must be valuable
in itself” (394). In fact, I never made
the claim that ‘the genetic material should not simply be valued
instrumentally’ in this paper. Again, I
refrained from offering an independent argument for the genetic account. So I shall ignore this comment.
[13] See, e.g., Jeff McMahan, "Our Fellow Creatures," Journal
of Ethics 9 (2005): 353-380, which Grau also cites.
[14] I would like to thank Chris Grau
and Wibke Gruetjen for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.